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Introduction 
Italy and Germany are locked in a struggle 
over access to Russian gas supplies and the 
construction of the controversial Nord Stream 2 
pipeline. That struggle threatens not only to 
complicate their bilateral relationship and their 
respective relationships with Russia, but also to 
thwart European Union (EU) efforts to 
consolidate a common approach to energy 
security and to create a formal energy union. 
In the wake of the United Kingdom’s (U.K.) 
historic June 23, 2016 (“Brexit”) referendum to 
leave the EU, the negative impact of this 
dispute on EU energy and trade issues could 
become heightened. The U.K., with its 
liberalized energy market, will no longer play a 
direct role in EU energy policy. Clashes over 
Nord Stream 2 and relations with Russia could 
exacerbate the EU’s cleavages, exactly at a 
time when the remaining EU member 
countries––especially Italy and Germany, 
which were two of the original six founding 
countries of the European customs union and 
single market––need to pull together.  
This paper examines the factors that have 
contributed to the German-Italian dispute over 
Nord Stream 2, including their respective 
relations with Russia. It also analyzes their 
significance for broader European energy 
dynamics and geopolitics. 
Italy has only recently re-emerged as a major 
player in the EU after more than a decade of 
political retreat, and it is exploring both the 
limits and opportunities of a new leadership 
role. Italy has been willing to challenge 
Germany on a number of issues, including the 
economic austerity measures that Berlin 
insisted on in response to the Eurozone crisis as 
a condition for financial assistance to ailing 
national banks and economies within the 
countries that adopted the Euro. Italy has also 
moved to oppose the German private sector-
backed decision by a consortium of German 
companies to finance and construct Nord 
Stream 2 and has accused the European 
Commission of adopting double standards in  
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not blocking the project. Germany has pushed 
back on both fronts. Meanwhile Russia, for its 
part, has tried to find ways to take advantage 
of the disagreement between Italy and 
Germany and consolidate its position as the 
primary natural gas supplier to Europe.  
Nord Stream 2: The project 
Nord Stream 2 is a project proposed by a 
consortium of companies led by Russia’s gas 
monopoly, Gazprom, which holds a 50 percent 
stake in the venture. The other 50 percent is 
equally divided among Germany’s BASF. and 
E.ON, France’s Engie, Austria’s OMV, and Royal 
Dutch Shell. The project would expand and 
complement the Nord Stream 1 pipeline that is 
already in operation transporting natural gas 
from Russia directly to Germany across the 
Baltic Sea. Like Nord Stream 1, the second 
pipeline would bypass the longstanding gas 
transit systems of Ukraine, the Czech Republic, 
and Slovakia, and pump 55 billion cubic 
meters (bcm) of Russian gas to Germany.1 The 
two main points of contention at the EU level 
have been the prospect that Nord Stream 2 will 
increase rather than reduce EU countries’ 
dependence on Russian gas and the loss of 
                                                 
 
1 Severin Fisher, “Nord Stream 2: Europe’s lack of Trust in 
its market model,” Policy perspectives Vol. 4/4, CSS ETH 
Zurich, March 2016. 
2 For further readings on the debate about Nord Stream 2 
see Andreas Goldthau: “Assessing Nord Stream 2: 
regulation, geopolitics & energy security in the EU, 
Central Eastern Europe & the UK,” Strategy Paper 10, 
Department of War Studies & King’s Russia Institute, 
2016. 
3 Tim Boersma, “Further reduction of Dutch natural gas 
production: The end of an era?,” Brookings Up Front, 
June 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-
front/posts/2015/06/26-dutch-natural-gas-production-
boersma.  
transit revenues for Ukraine at a juncture of 
acute economic crisis, following Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the 
subsequent war in Ukraine’s Donbas region.2  
Benefits to the EU energy market 
Analysts who question the long-term 
commercial viability and energy security 
benefits of Nord Stream 2 usually point out that 
Europe’s gas demand has been depressed 
since the 2008 economic crisis. However, the 
core goal of Nord Stream 2 is to replace 
declining volumes of European domestic fossil 
fuel production, and to meet new, albeit 
limited, demand for gas that will be generated 
by Germany and some other EU member 
states phasing out nuclear power.3 The 
majority of EU member states are projected, 
under most scenarios, to remain dependent on 
significant imports of Russian gas until at least 
2030.4 Moreover, absent drastic changes in 
energy consumption, the European gas supply 
mix—which includes a significant share of 
Russian gas—is not expected to change 
much.5  
4 See Ralf Dickel, Elham Hassanzadeh, James Henderson, 
Anouk Honoré, Laura El-Katiri, Simon Pirani, Howard 
Rogers, Jonathan Stern & Katja Yafimava,  “Reducing 
European Dependence on Russian Gas: Distinguishing 
Natural Gas Security from Geopolitics,” OIES Paper 93. 
Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2014,  
https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/NG-92.pdf.  
5 Tim Boersma, Tatiana Mitrova, Geert Greving, Anna 
Galkina, “The Impact of the Crisis in Ukraine on the 
European Gas Market,” Policy Brief, October 2014,  
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2014/10/eu
ropean-gas-market-import-dependence.  
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Nord Stream 2’s utility is also questioned in light 
of the fact that the full capacity of the Nord 
Stream 1 pipeline has not been fully-utilized, 
since the consortium has only secured access 
to 50 percent of the OPAL pipeline that 
connects Nord Stream 1 to onshore gas transit 
and distribution networks. This is, however, due 
to anti-monopoly limitations imposed by the 
EU’s Third Energy Package. In accordance with 
these provisions, the companies in the Nord 
Stream 1 consortium are precluded from using 
the pipeline’s full capacity and must make the 
additional 50 percent available to other gas 
suppliers.6  
Compliance with the EU Third Energy 
Package regulation 
The Third Energy Package is a set of directives 
adopted by the EU in 2009 to integrate 
national gas markets.7 The package represents 
the toughest hurdle for Gazprom’s investments 
in Europe because it stipulates that gas 
production and transmission must be 
managed by two different entities. In addition, 
third-party access to pipeline networks must be 
provided to competing gas suppliers. In 2011-
2012, Gazprom was granted an exemption 
from the application of the Third Energy 
Package for the construction of the Nord 
                                                 
6 Vladimir Socor, “Gazprom Required to De-Monopolize 
Access to German OPAL and NEL Pipelines,” Eurasia Daily 
Monitor, Volume 9, Issue 56, March 2012. 
7 The EU energy liberalization agenda started in 2009. For 
more background see Tim Boersma “Energy Security and 
Natural Gas Markets in Europe Lessons from the EU and 
the United States,” Routledge 2015. 
https://www.routledge.com/Energy-Security-and-
Natural-Gas-Markets-in-Europe-Lessons-from-the-
EU/Boersma/p/book/9781138795129.  
8 This is a major gray area, and lawyers will have to figure 
out whether or not the consortium will be exempted. For 
Stream 1 pipeline by the EU Commission. The 
Commission’s legal service has since issued 
opinions in defense of Nord Stream 2 that 
suggest EU energy market rules also do not 
apply in the case of the second pipeline––
raising the prospect of another official 
exemption from the EU Third Energy Package.8 
Bypassing Ukraine 
Since the crisis in Ukraine, many EU member 
states—not just Italy––have pointed out the 
political incoherence of building a new 
pipeline that clearly benefits Russia’s energy 
sector at a time when Russia is subject to EU 
and other international sanctions after the 
annexation of Crimea. The EU has also 
expressed economic as well as political 
support for Ukraine given that the proximate 
cause of the crisis and ensuing war in Donbas 
was Ukrainian and EU efforts in 2013 to 
conclude an association agreement and a 
deep and comprehensive trade agreement 
(DCFTA). The construction of Nord Stream 2 
would create a permanent alternative gas 
export route from Russia to Europe that would 
eclipse the existing pipeline network across 
Ukraine. As a result, Kiev would lose over $2 
billion annually in transit revenues.9 After the 
construction of Nord Stream 1, Poland had a 
similar experience in 2014.10 Ukraine would also 
other major pipeline projects, including Nord Stream 1 
and TAP, exemptions have been granted. That also raises 
questions on how these cases compare to Nord Stream 2 
and about the effectiveness of the EU law—in the sense 
that it should not be influenced by politics. For more 
details in this issue, see Sijbren De Jong, “Why Europe 
should fight Nord Stream II,” EUobserver, February 2016 
 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-585_en.htm.  
9 Interfax Ukraine 
http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/economic/289356.html.  
10 Strzelecki M., Martewicz M., “Gazprom Limits Polish 
Gas Supplies as Reverse Flows Halt,” Bloomberg, 
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likely find itself cut off from Russian gas supplies 
for its own domestic consumption. Even if 
destination clauses that prevent the buyer 
from reselling the natural gas were dropped, 
Gazprom would not export enough gas to 
allow European countries like Germany to 
resell excess domestic supply to Ukraine.11  
Since 2006, Ukrainian-Russian disputes over gas 
prices have been the source of major gas 
supply disruptions in Europe. Prior to the 
construction of Nord Stream 1, most of Russian 
gas to Europe had been exported through 
Cold War-era pipeline networks across Ukraine 
and Poland. Ukraine used the same pipelines 
both for domestic gas distribution and for gas 
transit to Europe. Consequently, when Russia 
cut gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006, 2009, and 
2014, it cut off supplies for Europe as well. For 
this reason, Russia has long tried to find 
alternative ways to reach the EU energy 
market—with the goal of completely cutting 
off Ukraine in 2019, when its current gas 
purchase contract with Gazprom expires. In 
December 2014, Gazprom’s CEO stated 
unequivocally that the role of Ukraine as a 
                                                 
September 2014 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-
10/poland-says-gazprom-cut-gas-supplies-via-belarus-
ukraine.  
11 PGNiG (Polskie Górnictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo SA), 
Poland’s main gas importer, was forced to use its traders 
in the German market to purchase the missing gas 
volumes. Such situations create market volatility and 
show that Gazprom treats clients in the CEE and Western 
Europe differently. See 
http://en.pgnig.pl/documents/18252/359153/Company+
Overview_EN_December+2014/b70516b7-6ae9-4c10-
85e0-9cdae9a031d9  
12 Karel Beckman, “Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller: This is the 
beginning of the end of Gazprom’s business model in 
Europe,” December 2014, www.energypost.eu. 
transit country for Russian gas will be reduced 
to zero.12  
Security reasons  
Beyond Ukraine, eight EU member states, all 
Central or Eastern European countries, signed 
a petition against Nord Stream 2 citing security 
concerns. The Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Croatia are the 
European countries most dependent on 
Russian natural gas. The signatories pointed out 
that Nord Stream 2 poses “risks for energy 
security in the region of Central and Eastern 
Europe, which is still highly dependent on a 
single source of energy.”13 In the view of some 
energy analysts, after the construction of Nord 
Stream 2, Russia could cut off gas supplies to 
these countries without affecting access to its 
main Western European market. The countries, 
could therefore all be simultaneously exposed 
to a loss in transit revenues and a shortage in 
gas supplies. 14 
13 Alan Riley, “Nord Stream 2: Too Many Obstacles, Legal, 
Economic, and Political to be Delivered?,” Issue Brief, 
Atlantic Council, November 2015  
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-
briefs/nordstream-2-too-many-obstacles-legal-economic-
and-political-to-be-delivered.  
14 A counter argument could be that since destination 
clauses are prohibited, CEE countries would be granted 
reverse flows. Last year, over 32 bcm of gas was re-
exported from Germany, partly to the CEE. See 
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/german-exports-
topped-30-bcm-in-2015-28791, However, as I explain 
later, it could also happen that Gazprom would not pump 
enough gas volume to allow Germany to re-sell it.  
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Italy, Germany, and Russia: Different 
perspectives 
Italy has very different concerns about Nord 
Stream 2, which are all closely related to the 
new role Italy wants to play within the 
European Union. After the controversial tenure 
of Silvio Berlusconi as prime minister, it was hard 
for Italy to rebuild international credibility and 
trust. In the EU, Italy was blamed, especially by 
Germany, for not respecting the parameters of 
the Maastricht Treaty and the Fiscal Compact. 
After four years of difficult reforms aimed at 
recovering from the economic crisis and 
preventing further damage, Italy wants to 
rehabilitate its foreign policy image. Since 
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi came to power, 
there have been three leitmotivs in the Italian 
approach towards the EU: 1) challenging 
austerity in economic policy; 2) appealing to 
the EU for assistance in managing the refugee 
crisis in the Mediterranean; and 3) seeking a 
leading role in European foreign policy. 
In contrast to Italy, Germany has long 
occupied a dominant position in the EU as the 
strongest European economy. After the 2014 
European parliamentary elections and the 
creation of a new Commission, Germans hold 
key positions in every institution of the EU. 
Among others, Uwe Corsepius is the General 
Secretary of the European Council, Klaus Welle 
is the Secretary General of the European 
Parliament, Martin Schulz is the president of the 
European Parliament, and Klaus Regling is the 
director of the European Stability Mechanism. 
Germany has always acted in total 
compliance with EU treaties, but it has also 
made clear that the EU cannot make a 
decision without Germany’s approval. This has 
created frictions within Germany and degrees 
of resentment toward the EU, especially when 
other countries are seen to take shortcuts or to 
avoid compliance. The success of the euro-
skeptic Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party in 
recent local elections underscores the current 
pressures facing German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel in maintaining Germany’s governing 
coalition, especially against the backdrop of 
the European refugee crisis. 
Italy’s aspirations to play a bigger role in 
Europe have put it in political rivalry with 
Germany. In 2014, Prime Minister Renzi pushed 
for stronger Italian representation in the EU in 
order to counterbalance what Rome considers 
to be Germany’s over-representation. Renzi, 
for example, lobbied for Italian Foreign Minister 
Federica Mogherini to become the EU High 
Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, ultimately overcoming the opposition of 
some EU member states who considered her 
“pro-Russian.”  
Relations with Russia and EU energy policy 
have both become part of this Italian-German 
rivalry, at a time after Brexit when three of the 
original six founding members of the EU––
France, Germany, and Italy––will play larger 
roles than before in shaping the future of 
Europe. A political and economic clash 
between Italy and Germany over Nord Stream 
2 and Russian energy could have broader 
political ramifications for the EU, especially as 
France does not have a particular stake in this 
issue.  
Berlin has traditionally adopted an 
accommodating political approach towards 
Moscow, but the Russian-German relationship 
has become more challenging. Despite 
significant commercial ties, the German 
government has adopted a very tough 
approach towards Russia since the beginning 
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of the Ukraine crisis in late 2013. German 
Chancellor Merkel has been one of the 
staunchest advocates of EU sanctions. Russia 
has retaliated by trying to exploit the divisions 
within German society toward the EU, 
including by financing euro-skeptic parties like 
the National Democratic Party and Pegida 
Movement.15 In addition, Russia has promoted 
and encouraged a pan-European anti-
fracking campaign aimed at preventing 
Germany (and other countries) from 
diversifying domestic energy sources and 
producing non-conventional gas and oil. 
Given the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region and 
the overall crisis in Russian-Ukrainian relations, 
completing Nord Stream 2 is a top priority for 
Moscow and Gazprom to secure its export 
routes to the European market, and head off 
the prospect of EU member states turning to 
LNG instead of pipeline gas from Russia.  
South Stream as political leverage 
In addition to Nord Steams 1 and 2 across the 
Baltic Sea, Russia has also pursued the 
development of a new gas export pipeline 
across the Black Sea—South Stream, which is 
part of a “pincers strategy” of pipeline 
networks aimed at binding Europe northwards 
and southwards to Gazprom and other Russian 
producers. Italy has been heavily involved in 
the development of the South Stream project, 
which is one factor in its opposition to Nord 
Stream 2.   
                                                 
15 Tony Paterson, “Putin’s far-right ambition: Think-tank 
reveals how Russian President is wooing – and funding – 
populist parties across Europe to gain influence in the 
EU,” The Independent, November 2014, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/puti
n-s-far-right-ambition-think-tank-reveals-how-russian-
president-is-wooing-and-funding-populist-9883052.html. 
The South Stream pipeline was an initiative led 
by Gazprom designed to connect Russia with 
Bulgaria across the Black Sea, bypassing 
Ukraine like Nord Stream, but also bypassing 
Turkey, where Russia constructed an earlier 
undersea gas pipeline, Blue Stream. Moscow’s 
and Gazprom’s goals since the early 2000s 
have been to ensure multiple direct pipeline 
routes to Europe to mitigate the transit risks to 
Russian interests and to maximize Russia’s 
export options and leverage. The Italian firm 
ENI held a 20 percent share in the South Stream 
venture, while its subsidy SAIPEM secured a $3 
billion contract to build the undersea section.16 
The EU Commission expressed vocal opposition 
to the construction of this particular pipeline 
and, in contrast to Nord Stream 1, found South 
Stream non-compliant with the EU Third Energy 
Package.  
Many energy experts consider South Stream a 
geopolitical rather than an economic project 
for Russia. The fact that Bulgaria was selected 
as the first EU country to receive gas from South 
Stream was viewed as telling. Bulgaria is a 
peripheral country for the European energy 
market and not a natural hub for gas 
redistribution. It is also a traditional Soviet-era 
bridgehead in Europe. Bulgaria and Russia 
have established strong business connections 
since the collapse of the USSR, with significant 
Russian investments in the Bulgarian energy 
and utilities sectors. South Stream would 
require new connecting pipelines across the 
Balkans and Adriatic to Italy and onward to 
Also see Mathew McDonald, “Putin and Pegida,” The 
American Interest, January 2015 http://www.the-
american-interest.com/2015/01/13/putin-and-pegida/.  
16 Emanuele Scimia, “South Stream’s Demise Shakes up 
Italian-Russian Relations,” December 2014 
http://oilprice.com/Energy/Natural-Gas/South-Streams-
Demise-Shakes-up-Italian-Russian-Relations.html,  
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other EU markets that would also be in 
competition with new pipeline networks from 
Azerbaijan and Turkey favored by the EU, 
including the Southern Gas Corridor and TAP.17  
Under EU pressure, the South Stream project 
was ultimately suspended in 2014 to loud 
Italian complaints about the economic losses 
for its energy industry. The details of the deal 
and the structure of ENI’s participation in South 
Stream reveal a more complex story. Italy’s 
energy giant, ENI, is a unique European 
company that, like Russia’s Gazprom, deals 
with all stages of the oil and gas business—
upstream, midstream, and downstream—and 
handles all operations from extraction to 
distribution through its own infrastructure. In the 
case of South Stream, ENI was not responsible 
for gas extraction, so the profitability of the 
project would have been more limited than in 
other ENI ventures in the Middle East and North 
Africa. In addition, when the project was 
suspended in 2014, ENI had not spent much 
money, while Gazprom eventually decided to 
pay $1 billion in compensation to the 
consortium to cover their stakes.18  
There was, in fact, no real loss for ENI—
especially as ultimately, once the pipeline was 
built, the infrastructure construction costs 
would fall on the end gas consumers. ENI has 
also retained a broader deal with Gazprom for 
gas supplies. Absent gas deliveries through 
South Stream, these exports are brought 
                                                 
17 Interview with Edward Chow, senior fellow in the 
Energy and National Security Program at CSIS, April 2016. 
18 “Gazprom pays $1bn for EU partner shares in South 
Stream,” Russia Today, March 2015 
https://www.rt.com/business/245621-gazprom-partners-
debt-shares/.  
19  However, ENI and Gazprom still disagree on the gas 
price, which is normally linked to the oil price: Gazprom 
through Gazprom’s access point in Slovakia.19 
Furthermore, the Italian government’s most 
vocal complaints about economic losses 
came just as Nord Stream 2 was launched. 
Rome criticized EU double standards in pushing 
to suspend South Stream and called on the 
Commission to deal with Nord Stream 2 in the 
same way. Between the lines, Rome was 
clearly demanding that the EU treat Italy and 
Germany as equal powers with equal rights to 
have their own signature gas pipeline projects 
with Russia.  
Nord Stream 2’s threat to Italy’s role as an 
energy hub 
Energy has always been an issue for Italy given 
its significant dependence on gas and oil 
imports, and due to a strong environmental 
bias in its energy policies. The use of nuclear 
energy was rejected in 1987, and there have 
been several efforts to prohibit drilling within 12 
miles of the Italian coast, including through a 
referendum in April 2016. Italy is the EU’s 
second largest importer of Russian gas. Natural 
gas accounts for nearly a half the total value 
of Italy’s imported goods and is mainly used in 
electricity generation for manufacturing 
plants.20 
To date, most of Italy’s gas imports from Russia 
have come through Ukraine. If Gazprom 
succeeds in cutting off its exports through 
Ukraine in 2019, which might be the case if 
wants ENI to pay the price established in their agreement 
eight years ago, while ENI wants the market price. Thus, 
ENI is likely taking Gazprom into arbitration. 
20 Nicolò Sartori,  “Rotta di collisione su Nord Stream 2,” 
Affar Internazionali, December 2015 
http://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID=3263.  
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Nord Stream 2 is completed, then all Italian gas 
imports would transit through Germany. Italy 
would then pay higher gas prices along with 
the transit fees as the costs for building the new 
distribution infrastructure would be amortized 
through an increase in the consumer price of 
the gas. 
In addition to raising gas prices for Italian 
consumers, Nord Stream 2 threatens to 
undercut Italy’s role as a EU energy hub in the 
Mediterranean, and one of the key elements 
in the proposed framework for the European 
Energy Union.21 Since the suspension of South 
Stream, the Italian government has focused on 
supporting the development of the Southern 
Gas Corridor (SGC). This is a threefold system of 
pipelines aimed at reducing Europe’s 
dependence on Russian gas: 1) the South 
Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), bringing Azerbaijani 
gas from the Caspian Sea to the Georgian-
Turkish border; 2) the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
(TAP), now in the initial stages of construction, 
which will transport gas directly to Italy; and 3) 
the Trans-Anatolia Natural Gas Pipeline 
(TANAP), which is under construction and will 
connect the other two pipelines by 2018. This 
project is being carried out by the Italian-
based engineering company, Nuovo Pignone, 
                                                 
21 This is a project launched by the Junker EU Commission 
aimed at diversifying energy sources and implementing 
European initiatives on the Southern shore of the 
Mediterranean. It was developed following the crisis in 
Ukraine, which endangered EU energy supplies; its five 
priority actions are: 1) energy security, trust, and 
solidarity; 2) full integration of the EU energy market; 3) 
energy efficiency to contain demand; 4) de-carbonization 
of the economy; and 5) research and innovation. Italy was 
supposed to be a key transit country for Northern Europe 
and bolster the energy interconnections between EU 
member states.  
22 Emanuele Scimia, “Southern Gas Corridor’s Advance 
Cool off Energy Cooperation Between Italy and Russia,” 
along with the infrastructure group SNAM, and 
SAIPEM (ENI’s subsidy), as well as another 
Italian oil and gas contractor, MICOPERI.22 
These projects have intensified Italy’s 
cooperation with Azerbaijan, which became 
the largest oil supplier to the Italian market in 
2013 and 2014. In the first eleven months of 
2015, Azerbaijan covered 17.9 percent of 
Italian crude oil requirements.23 TAP will carry 10 
bcm of Azerbaijani offshore gas to Europe by 
2020, with the prospect of doubling future 
supplies through the Ionian Adriatic Pipeline 
and the Interconnector Greece-Bulgaria. 
Relations between Moscow and Rome remain 
strong and Italy’s energy partnership with 
Azerbaijan is not conceived as being anti-
Russian. Although Russia’s energy exports to 
Italy have decreased in the last two years due 
to a fall in demand, Russia nonetheless remains 
Italy’s main supplier of natural gas. 24  Moscow 
has so far given no indication that it sees the 
Italian energy market as a zero-sum-game field 
and has expressed any public concern about 
the SGC as a competitor to South Stream or 
other energy projects. Azerbaijan cannot 
match the 147 bcm of gas that Gazprom 
provided to Europe in 2014; and Gazprom has 
even stated its willingness to also transit some 
Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 145 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_tt
news%5Btt_news%5D=44248&cHash=7a7fb0b186b7a58
d38a711a3b2089cc1#.VzngYJPhBsM.  
23 “Importazioni di greggio per paese di provenienza,” July 
2015 www.unionepetrolifera.it.  
24 Emanuele Scimia, “For Now, Italy’s Relations With 
Azerbaijan Do Not Upset Russia,” Eurasia Daily Monitor, 
Volume 13, Issue 35, February 2016 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_tt
news%5BbackPid%5D=27&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=45
121#.VznhR5PhDR0.  
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of its own gas, along with Azerbaijani gas, in 
the SGC.  
Compared to other competing pipeline 
projects, the construction of Nord Stream 2 is a 
major threat to Italy’s role as energy hub. 
Transferring the fulcrum of EU energy supply 
north towards Germany would reduce the 
benefits of the SGC development, and 
undercut central Italy’s role in redistributing 
Caspian gas to the rest of the EU market. If 
Russian gas is exported exclusively through 
Germany, then the Azerbaijani gas transferred 
to Italy through TAP will barely fulfill 1 percent 
of European gas demand. Russian gas 
currently accounts for more than 20 percent. 
Germany would become the dominant 
European and EU gas hub. 
Italy’s response to Nord Stream 2 
Italy is thus less concerned about economic 
losses to its companies from the suspension of 
South Stream and more worried about losing its 
competitive advantage in the European 
energy sector to Germany. Italy opposes Nord 
Stream 2 because of the threat this poses to 
Italy’s position as Europe’s Mediterranean 
energy hub. Relations with Russia are also a key 
element in Italy’s reaction to Nord Stream 2. 
Italy is Russia’s fifth-largest foreign trade 
partner. Russia exports 15 percent of its oil to 
Italy and 30 percent of its gas, in addition to 
ferrous and nonferrous metals and timber. On 
the other hand, Italy delivers manufactured 
goods, textile fabrics, machinery, chemical 
products, and consumer durables to Russia. 
Almost 500 Italian firms have offices in Russia.  
                                                 
25 Beda Romano, “Renzi critica Merkel: non raccontateci 
che date il sangue per l’Europa,” Il Sole 24ore, December 
2015 http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2015-12-
Russia is also a key strategic partner for Italy, 
which has longstanding national interests in 
Libya. The Libyan crisis, the growing terrorist 
threat from the Islamic State in Libya, and all 
the difficulties related to harboring refugees 
attempting to reach Italy from the Libyan 
coast have been a major political and 
economic (as well as security) preoccupation 
for the Italian government. Libyan instability 
has severely affected the Italian energy 
market. Before the current crisis, Italy imported 
20 percent of its oil and 10 percent of its natural 
gas from Libya. The Italian government seeks 
Russia’s support at the United Nations level to 
help establish and agree on a long-term 
strategy for dealing with Libya and ensuring its 
long-term stability. Rome sees close energy 
relations with Moscow as a key factor in 
encouraging broader political cooperation. 
In the meantime, as in other areas of Italian-
Russian relations, Italy has adopted a dual-
track strategy in response to Nord Stream 2. On 
the one hand, Rome complains about the 
project’s non-compliance with the Third 
Energy Package and denounces the 
Commission’s double standard, insisting that 
the EU should properly review Nord Stream 2 
before the project can proceed. Renzi has also 
stressed it is inconsistent for the EU to prolong its 
economic sanctions on Russia and insist on the 
suspension of South Stream if the Commission 
simply allows Nord Stream to go ahead. 25 
At the same time, Italy has also sought bilateral 
agreements with Russia, including even 
securing a role for Italian companies in the 
Nord Stream 2 construction. Russia’s Gazprom-
owned newspaper, Kommersant.ru, for 
18/il-bilancio-premier-2015-italia-segnale-svolta--
140737.shtml?uuid=AClcm2vB.  
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example, reported that SAIPEM is the most 
likely candidate to acquire the $4 billion 
contract for constructing the two underwater 
branches of North Stream 2 across the Baltic 
Sea. The scale of the construction is huge––the 
pipelines would extend 25,000 km with a 
capacity 55 bcm per year. The Russian 
newspaper reported that SAIPEM has a good 
chance of winning the contract because of its 
previous construction work with Gazprom for 
North Stream 1. Some Italian experts are 
skeptical that Italian companies would gain 
any advantage from joining the Nord Stream 2 
consortium.26 ENI’s primary revenues come 
from gas extraction, and as Nord Stream 2 
does not offer this option, ENI’s profit margin 
would be low. Only SAIPEM, which focuses on 
pipeline infrastructure would stand to benefit; 
and any profits from ENI’s participation in Nord 
Stream 2 would still be eclipsed by the losses 
related to Italy losing its position as an energy 
hub to Germany. 
Italy has other cards to play with Moscow. In 
early 2016, Russia’s Gazprom, Italy’s Edison, 
and Greece’s DEPA signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding for a project resembling a 
scaled down version of South Stream.27 Instead 
of 63 bcm, this project envisages the 
construction of a pipeline with a capacity of 16 
bcm that would run in parallel with the 
Southern Gas Corridor to Bulgaria. From there 
the pipeline would be extended to Greece, 
joining the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy 
(ITGI), which is still waiting final completion. If 
realized, this project could bring significant 
volumes of Russian gas directly to Italy. Like 
                                                 
26 Interview Nicolò Sartori, Senior Fellow in the Energy 
Program at the Institute of International Affairs, Rome, 
Italy, March 2016. 
27 “Edison-Gazprom-Depa: accordo per il gasdotto Italia-
Grecia,” La Repubblica, February 2016 
Nord Stream 2, the pipeline would bypass 
Ukraine. If the EU Commission allows the 
construction of Nord Stream 2, Italian analysts 
believe it would be hard for the Commission to 
then justify blocking this pipeline project. 
Italy and Russia have no significant history of 
competition or conflict, in spite of Italy’s role in 
World War II. Since the 2000s, Italy has aspired 
to be “the” European leader in relations with 
Russia, or at least equal to Germany in making 
decisions over broader EU relations with Russia. 
Italy certainly wants to make sure that German 
interests do not supersede those of Italy and do 
not interfere with Italy’s economic, trade, and 
security strategies. Thus, Italy always attempts 
to position itself at the forefront when it comes 
to the EU’s interactions with Russia. Prime 
Minister Matteo Renzi was the only 
representative of EU member states to attend 
the St. Petersburg Economic Forum in June 
2016 together with EU President Jean-Claude 
Juncker. He has also made it clear that he will 
use Nord Stream and the dispute with 
Germany as political leverage within the EU if it 
will advance Italy’s interests.  
Germany’s perspective on Nord Stream 2 
Like Italy, Germany sees its energy security as 
closely linked to Russia—partly because 
Germany is dismantling its nuclear plants and 
EU energy production is declining, but also 
because Germany wants to play a key role in 
determining European gas prices. In 2013, 
German imports of Russian gas amounted to 
39 percent of Germany’s total imports, and 
http://www.repubblica.it/economia/finanza/2016/02/24
/news/edison-gazprom-
depa_accordo_per_il_gasdotto_italia-grecia-134164530/.  
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there is no immediate substitute for Russian gas 
in Germany. A new deal between Gazprom 
and German gas companies in September 
2015 strengthened the already close supply 
connections.28 The combination of Nord 
Stream 1 and 2 could increase the total flow of 
Russian gas to Germany to 110 bcm annually.  
German officials have made some 
reassurances not only to Ukraine but also to 
Poland and Belarus about the impact of Nord 
Stream 2 on their interests.29 According to 
Gernot Erler, the German government’s 
special coordinator for Russian policy, the 
“additional capacities will result in better 
energy security in Europe.” This is partially true, 
but how real these reassurances will be over 
the long term is difficult to say. In 2015, for 
example, Gazprom reduced its total natural 
gas flows to Poland specifically to prevent EU 
member states from then supplying Ukraine via 
reverse flows through the existing Ukrainian-
European pipeline network.30 Gazprom could 
easily do this again. Also, if gas demand rises 
again in the EU, there may not be sufficient gas 
to supply Ukraine as well as other Central 
European countries would be supplied through 
Nord Stream 2 gas.  
Nord Stream 2 is clearly more than just a 
commercial project for Germany. Germany’s 
dependence on Russian gas, as well as the 
German business community’s financial and 
                                                 
28 Hannes Adomeit, “Germany, EU and Russia: The 
conflict over Nord Stream 2,” Policy Brief series Centre for 
European Studies/EU Centre of Excellence of Carleton 
University Ottawa.  
29 “Germany seeks to overcome opposition to Nord 
Stream 2,” February 2016 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/germany
-seeks-to-overcome-opposition-to-nord-stream-2/.  
trade interests in Russia have generated 
considerable domestic pressure to construct 
Nord Stream 2. At the same time, the views of 
the German business community about lifting 
sanctions on Russia are more diverse. Some 
business groups like the Ost-Ausschuss would 
like to see sanctions lifted, but they are the 
minority. The bulk of German industry and 
commerce has adopted an almost unanimous 
position in supporting the government's 
choices. The chairmen of other two big 
business associations like the Bundesverband 
der Deutschen Industrie (BDI) and the 
Osteuropaverein der Deutschen Wirtschaft 
have openly stated that they “adhere to the 
principle of the primacy of politics.” 31   
In Germany, the balance of power between 
politics and economics leans towards the 
former—state interest takes precedence. Thus, 
the Nord Stream 2 project is moving ahead not 
simply because of lobbying by the German 
business community. German ruling elites also 
support building the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. 
Although it can be argued that Nord Stream 2 
enjoys multilevel consensus, Germany’s 
attitude towards the project has not always 
been clear. There are two key factors to 
consider: Germany’s relations with Russia in 
light of the Ukraine crisis, and disagreements 
within the German political elite and parties on 
this issue.  
30 Marek Strzelecki, Maciej Martewicz, “Gazprom Limits 
Polish Gas Supplies as Reverse Flows Halt,” Bloomberg 
September 2014 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-09-
10/poland-says-gazprom-cut-gas-supplies-via-belarus-
ukraine.  
31 Hannes Adomeit, “Germany’s Russia Policy: From 
Sanctions to Nord Stream 2? “Transatlantic Academy 
2015-16 Paper Series, No.3 March 2016. 
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Germany’s Ambivalence on Russia and 
Nord Stream 2 
Russia is a very sensitive issue in German 
society. There are two main groups: 1) the 
supporters of ostpolitik who wish to engage 
Russia cooperatively and whose pro-Russian 
sentiment is also tinged with anti-Americanism; 
and 2) those who grew up in Eastern Germany, 
like Chancellor Merkel, who are more critical of 
the Russian political system and its poor human 
rights record. There are around 4 million Russian 
speakers in Germany, divided among ethnic 
Russians, Russian descendants from German 
migrants to the Russian and Soviet empires, 
and Russian Jews.32 
During the Ukraine crisis, Chancellor Merkel 
acted as the leading stateswoman of the EU. 
She adopted a strong position on sanctions 
and urged reluctant countries like Italy and 
smaller eastern European countries with close 
relations with Russia, like Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Cyprus, to support 
them. At the same time, Merkel never closed 
the door to dialogue and always bore German 
national interests in mind. Chancellor Merkel 
has talked to Putin more frequently than any 
other world leader. She made 35 phone calls in 
the first eight months of 2015, for example. 
Germany has more trade with Russia than any 
other European state. Germany’s eastward-
oriented business sector is a powerful lobby, 
including specifically within Merkel’s own 
Christian Democratic Union (CDU). In March 
2014, at the peak of the Crimea crisis, Merkel 
                                                 
32 Interview with Angela Stent, Senior Fellow at the 
Transatlantic Academy and the German Marshall Fund, 
April 2016. 
33 “Merkel defends Nord Stream-2 pipeline,” Russia 
Today, December 2015 https://www.rt.com/business/326440-
merkel-gas-nord-stream2/.  
met with the four largest German business 
associations in Munich for high-level talks 
about trade between Russia and Germany 
and the implications of the crisis.  
Despite her assertive attitude towards the 
Russian Federation, Merkel has seemed to 
support the Nord Stream 2 project. In 
December 2015, she stated: “I made clear, 
along with others, that this is a commercial 
project; there are private investors.”33 
However, her defense of Nord Stream 2 is 
closely linked to other trends in Germany’s 
political landscape. Germany’s Vice 
Chancellor and Economic Minister, Sigmar 
Gabriel, is one of the main supporters of the 
Nord Stream 2 deal. He personally travelled to 
Russia to conclude the deal with Putin in the 
Kremlin. Gabriel has asserted that Brussels and 
the EU should have limited involvement with 
the project.34 He has also presented both 
Germany’s leverage in the EU and the Nord 
Stream 2 as a means of improving relations 
between Germany and Russia to address the 
Syria crisis, which has sent millions of refugees 
into Europe and Germany.  
The Bavarian “sister party” of the CDU, the 
Christian Social Union (CSU) is particularly 
critical of the EU sanctions against Russia, 
which it sees as an obstacle to securing 
Moscow’s assistance in resolving the civil war in 
Syria. The CSU has openly criticized Merkel’s 
choices related to the refugee crisis and has 
stressed that cooperation with Russia is an 
important way of also coping with this issue. 
34 Albrecht Meier, “Putin and Gabriel team up on Nord 
Stream 2 against Brussels,” November 2015 
http://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/putin-
and-gabriel-team-up-on-nord-stream-2-against-brussels/.  
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Similarly, the German Foreign Minister Frank-
Walter Steinmeier, who is the leader of the 
German Social Democratic Party (SPD) seems 
to support dialogue and compromise with 
Russia, in spite of his open skepticism that lifting 
sanctions will result in a constructive Russian 
role in Syria. Steinmeier insists that 
implementing the German and French-
backed Minsk II plan for the war in Ukraine is 
indispensable for achieving a rapprochement 
with Moscow. The current EU sanctions are 
closely linked to the implementation of Minsk II. 
Despite the explicit support of the Green Party, 
which opposes accommodation with Russia, 
Chancellor Merkel clearly cannot just ignore 
the stances of other prominent German 
politicians, who are instrumental in her 
coalition government. She needs to signal 
flexibility towards Russia on Nord Stream 2, 
even though she has acknowledged the 
potential damage Nord Stream 2 could do to 
European energy independence and to the 
credibility of European foreign policy. From a 
market perspective, a national government 
pressuring its companies to dump a pipeline 
project would seem very outdated and anti-
free market.35According to some analysts, 
Chancellor Merkel may be encouraging the EU 
Commission behind the scenes to review the 
Nord Stream 2 project for its non-compliance 
with the EU Third Energy Package. If the 
Commission does not grant Nord Stream 2 the 
same exemption as Nord Stream 1, Merkel 
could avoid all of the negative consequences 
of having to intervene herself, and could 
present the decision as a more coherent 
choice for the EU in general.  
                                                 
35 Severin Fisher, “Nord Stream 2: Europe’s lack of Trust 
in its market model,” Policy perspectives Vol. 4/4 March 
2016., CSS ETH Zurich.  
Conclusion  
This analysis has examined Italian and German 
perspectives on energy security, relations with 
Russia and EU foreign policy, through the lens 
of Nord Stream 2. For Italy, Nord Stream 2 
threatens its role as an energy hub in the 
Mediterranean and its competitive position vis-
à-vis Germany within the European Union. 
Nord Stream 2 means an Italian loss in political 
terms to Germany, including accepting the 
reality of an EU double standard when it comes 
to endorsing large German energy projects. 
Rome has adopted a dual-track strategy in 
response to Nord Stream 2, challenging the EU 
to rule against the project, and seeking to 
engage Moscow directly and bilaterally. For 
Germany, Nord Stream 2 is a matter of securing 
economic advantage. It allows Germany a 
greater role in determining European gas 
prices and reduces transit risks from the Ukraine 
crisis. Germany’s political ambivalence toward 
this project is related to the complexity of its 
coalition politics and the need for the 
Chancellor to balance different interests within 
the government and in German society, 
including in the business community. Italy and 
Germany have a shared interest in maintaining 
good relations—or at least economic 
cooperation—with Russia at both the national 
and European level. So far, they are pursuing 
selective cooperation in the critical energy 
market.  
Russia has ample opportunity to take 
advantage of the Italian-German 
disagreements over Nord Stream 2 in order to 
gain leverage in EU foreign policy and 
ultimately discourage Europe from diversifying 
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its energy supplies and seeking other sources of 
gas, including LNG. Against the backdrop of 
the crisis in Ukraine and the imposition of EU 
sanctions, as well as the recent decision by the 
UK to leave the EU, the clash between Italy and 
Germany could complicate the EU’s ability to 
forge a common strategy for managing the 
relationship with Russia. The dispute over Nord 
Stream 2 has already complicated the 
ongoing EU efforts to create an energy union, 
by undermining the Commission’s role in 
setting the frame for energy policy and being 
seen to act as an impartial arbiter.  
To resolve this problem, the EU will either have 
to devise a legal framework that ensures clarity 
and predictability for reviewing and approving 
projects like Nord Stream 2, or formulate a 
more coherent political strategy within the 
Commission to cope with this issue. Given all 
the current risks to the European project, the 
EU, together with Italy and Germany, needs to 
find ways to resolve this dispute and to reach a 
common perspective on Nord Stream 2 that 
reduces the sense of political competition and 
contention. Without a clear energy strategy 
and a clear approach towards Russia, 
Europe’s ambiguity in managing high profile 
projects like Nord Stream 2 will undermine the 
coherence of the EU foreign policy. 
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List of Acronyms 
 
ADF Alternative für Deutschland   Alternative 
for Germany  
 
BDI  Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie 
Federal Association of German Industry 
 
CDU  Christian Democratic Union of Germany 
 
CEE   Central and Eastern Europe  
 
CEO  Chief Executive Officer 
 
CSU  Christian Social Union in Bavaria  
 
EU    European Union 
 
ITGI  Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy  
 
LNG  Liquefied Natural Gas 
 
Med-REG Mediterranean Energy Regulators 
 
Med-TSO Mediterranean Transmission System 
Operators 
 
OPAL  Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung      
Baltic Sea Pipeline 
 
SCP  South Caucasus Pipeline 
 
SGC  Southern Gas Corridor 
 
TANAP  Trans-Anatolian Pipeline 
 
TAP  Trans Adriatic Pipeline 
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